








Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat​[1]​
INTRODUCTION
It is commonplace for materialists to identify the mind with the brain, or perhaps the whole nervous system, in which the rest of the world serves as a source of input and receiver of output.  This view has been challenged by the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) that contends the mind is constituted, in part, by the physical environment outside the head.​[2]​  At some times EC is offered as a thesis about our mentalistic folk categories (e.g. belief), and sometimes it is put forward as a claim about explanatory kinds of interest to cognitive science.  Either way, EC offers a radical alternative to the traditional way of drawing the boundary between mind and world, and given its revolutionary agenda, it is reasonable to demand that it be strongly motivated.  
Both versions are present in Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) seminal explication of EC.  As a thesis about folk categories, Clark and Chalmers offer thought experiments exploiting functionalist intuitions to show that resources other than internal neural systems, such as Otto’s address-book, can be part of the physical realization, or cognitive vehicle, of someone’s standing beliefs.​[3]​  A cognitive or representational vehicle is the material substrate “carrying” mental contents, somewhat as paper and ink “carry” the semantic contents of a novel.  They contend that a notebook counts as a genuine memory vehicle given that the information it contains plays a causal-explanatory role sufficiently similar to the role of neural memory in a normal subject (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.647). They also claim that EC has great empirical significance.  It is said to offer a more powerful, unifying, explanatory framework for cognitive science because it helps researchers see how the same type of cognitive process can have both extended and internal implementations. 
	However, it has been argued that, as a thesis about folk categories, EC is counterintuitive because it takes an excessively permissive (or “liberal”) position—this is also known as the problem of “cognitive bloat” (Clark 2008, p.80, p.278).  While EC’s advocates wish to “supersize” the mind, they have no desire to overextend the boundaries.  All sorts of things that are not part of one’s mental vehicle play a causal-explanatory role when it comes to supplying information.  If a notebook counts as part of one’s mind, then why not the yellow pages, the internet, or even parts of the natural world that supply information and support cognition (Rupert 2004, pp.401ff.)?  What I will call “superdupersizing” is the undesirable result of such unchecked inflation of the mental vehicle.  EC’s intuitive and scientific plausibility would be forfeited if it implied clouds, rain, wind, moon, or other remote and multifarious parts of the world are parts of one’s mind.  While a complete defense of EC requires a mark, or criterion, of the mental, in the spirit of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998, p.659) conditions of “trust and glue” my interest here is restricted to recent suggestions by some of EC’s advocates concerning cognitive bloat. 
	The remainder of this paper is organized into the following sections.  First, I provide some background on EC’s persisting difficulties with superdupersizing.  The second section presents two very similar responses to cognitive bloat, as offered by Rowlands and Clark.  What I call Teleological Extended Cognition (TEC) claims that a satisfactory criterion of the mental individuates genuine cognitive processes according to their proper function, that is, in virtue of a trait’s selection history.  The final sections develop three objections to TEC.  The third section offers counter examples showing that it fails to provide either a necessary or sufficient condition for the cognitive since is not capable of countering intuitive worries about bloat.  The fourth section develops the criticism that TEC also violates a widespread assumption in cognitive science known as Methodological Individualism or the view that explanatory kinds are individuated on the basis of causal powers.  I will argue this is because TEC conflates different types of scientific projects.  The fifth section explains why TEC is self-defeating.  This is followed by a brief conclusion.
1. FROM SUPERSIZING TO SUPERDUPERSIZING
The cognitive bloat objection is similar to the accusation that EC rests on a confusion between the coupling of the mind to merely helpful processes with the claim that such processes are properly cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2008).  Rupert (2004, p.396) makes a similar point about what he calls “epistemic dependence” – just because understanding a system A requires some understanding of a process B, doesn’t imply that B is a part of A.  Clearly, such conflations would lead to superdupersizing, though the bloat problem does not logically depend on them.  However, bloat is an obvious threat to EC, as has been recognized from the beginning.
Some of EC’s defenders agree the situation is not improved by Clark and Chalmers’ original conditions of trust-and-glue (1998, p.649, Clark 2008, p.79).  Clark (2008, p.80) concedes they are inadequate, and yet to abandon them “opens the floodgates to what many would regard as an unwelcome explosion of potential dispositional beliefs.”  Rowlands echoes Clark’s worries about bloat, arguing that EC is “too permissive, and we will be forced to admit into the category of the cognitive all sort sorts [sic] of structures and processes that clearly are not cognitive” (Rowlands 2009, p.2).  Rowlands also rejects the trust-and-glue conditions since they are incompatible with unconsciously tokened beliefs (2009, p.6).  
	Dissatisfaction with previous attempts to formulate a mark has independently led Clark (2007, 2008) and Rowlands (2009) to draw on naturalized teleology and proper functioning.  In Rowlands’ version, it is sufficient for an external resource to count as part of the cognitive processes if it has the right kind of selection history.  Meanwhile, Clark maintains that an external resource must possess certain historical properties fixing its information-providing role.  In this paper I argue against these proposals on the grounds that such historically-oriented, proper function, elucidations of extended cognition are highly counter-intuitive by Rowlands’ and Clark’s own standards, and inimical to EC’s ambition to be taken seriously as a scientific hypothesis.  In short, I shall consider and reject these recent efforts to defend extended cognition from the problem of cognitive bloat.
2. TELEOLOGICAL EXTENDED COGNITION
Clark (2008) and Rowlands (2009) now argue that bloat can be avoided by understanding genuinely cognitive extended resources in terms of certain historically individuated proper functions.  Rowlands invokes Millikan’s (1984, 1993) view that a system has the proper function of providing information if this is its “purpose” in the strictly naturalistic “etiological” sense that it has “the appropriate sort of history” (2009, p.8).  This means that something has a proper function in virtue of being an adaptation, that is, because other traits of which it is a descendent were fitness-raising, e.g. as when the heart’s pumping blood today is explained by the pumping of ancestral hearts (Wright, 1973).  The “specific character” of the implementing mechanism is irrelevant as long as the proper function is realized (Rowlands 2009, p.16).  This conception is also normative—a proper function is defined in terms of what it is supposed to do, not what it does do (i.e. it can “misfire”).  Nor must the appropriate sort of history be biological (p.8), as in the (derived) proper function of a telescope, which is to make certain information available (p.14).​[4]​
Bloat results from conceptual liberalism, so combating it requires conditions that are more stringent.  More stringency can be acquired in two ways: a new condition that is merely necessary would reverse bloat to some degree, while a condition that is individually sufficient would avoid it altogether, though at the cost of failing to account for other kinds of sufficiency.  Of course, a genuine mark of the cognitive needs to offer conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient.
One complication with Rowlands’ exposition is that it is not always clear whether his new criterion is intended as sufficient, merely necessary, or perhaps as a fully formed mark of the cognitive stating what all and only cognitive states hold in common.  In fact Rowlands’ new “mark” is only supposed to provide a sufficient condition for cognitive processes (2009, p.2).  A process is cognitive if it “belongs to” or is “owned by” a subject and has the proper function of making information available to that subject in the form of representations or information bearing-structures (p.8).  The account “is understood as providing a sufficient condition,” (p.10) despite some inelegant remarks that could be taken as reasons for thinking otherwise.  For example, the criterion is introduced as specifying what “a process must satisfy in order to qualify” (p.2), or, in other words, what is essential.  I assume this is just a slip, as is the use of “if and only if” (p.8) to introduce the four parts of his new criterion.  This is because he soon clarifies matters stating the criterion “is intended only as providing a sufficient condition for cognition” (p.10), and elsewhere he explicitly doubts that it offers a necessary condition (p.8).  Still, if his condition really is sufficient, then it cannot result in bloat. 
Rowlands’ version of TEC rests on what he calls “integration” and “ownership” (2009, p.17).  Being an owned cognitive process depends on its having the proper function of providing information to the subject in the form of representations.  The idea of an information-bearing structure, interpreted too loosely, would obviously result in superdupersizing, as even distant stars and galaxies bear information and exert some causal influence upon us.  
Ownership, or what he also calls the “who aspect,” is “integration into the [psychological] life…the conscious life of the subject” (p.17).  As this presupposes a criterion for consciousness, the suggestion is hard to summarize non-circularly; consciousness is a paradigmatic example of cognition, and so it’s not very illuminating to define cognition in terms of it.  Another problem concerns what counts as ownership and conscious integration.  The integration of a vehicle responsible for providing information presumably means its contents become consciously accessible; this is what makes that vehicle part of the conscious cognitive processes.  The trouble with this suggestion is that there are many content carrying vehicles whose contents are consciously accessible, but those vehicles are not literally part of any cognitive process (as with the Yellow Pages, etc).  In fairness, Rowlands might mean that integration depends on more than just conscious accessibility in a broad sense, but then it is up to him to develop the suggestion in a way that does not beg the question.
Rowlands also claims that the bloat worry is driven by the assumption “that there are no subjectless cognitive processes: they always have an owner, and this owner is an individual of some form” (2009, p.15).  This, he says, is “the intuition upon which the problem is predicated” (p.15)—that is, if it’s given there’s an owner, then there’s a dangling question about what’s owned.  But then there is no “special problem” for externalism (p.16), since the explanation of ownership is just as much a problem for “internalist accounts of cognition” (p.16).  
This understates the resources available to the internalist, however, as not all versions are committed to the ownership of cognitive processes.  An eliminativist standpoint, which does away with talk of subjects (but not mental states), is not.  And the idea of mental processes belonging to no subject is eccentric, but not unheard of.​[5]​  But perhaps this is missing the point (there could be exotic versions of EC that also dispense with ownership).  A better reply is that there is indeed a special problem for the externalist when it comes to accommodating other intuitions about the bounds of the cognitive vehicle.  Neural resources bundled within the skull are highly similar, at least compared to notebooks, and it is no surprise that the brain is usually thought to constitute a reasonably well-defined explanatory domain.​[6]​  
Turning now to Clark (2008), he also invokes an etiological analysis of proper function in his response to the problem of cognitive bloat.  Next I offer an overview of Clark’s version of TEC, which is somewhat more developed than Rowlands’, and comes with some important differences.
Extended cognition claims that traditional ways of distinguishing mind from world are excessively chauvinistic, but this conservatism prevents the attribution of mind widely and wantonly.  Consider Clark’s endorsement of Gallagher’s claim (Clark 2008, p.128) that facts about the body “structure” the mind insofar as they “set the scene” for cognizing in various ways.  Although one’s spatial position also constrains how one perceives things, Gallagher does not go so far as to say that spatial position is itself a mental phenomenon.  Yet he mysteriously allows that “gesture, and expressive movement” are aspects of mind (2008, p.129).  Why the difference, given that both contribute to the casual background of cognition?  Clark raises the same issue with his example of rain beating rhythmically against a window, which helps sequence the flow of his thoughts while writing: “Is the rain now part of my cognitive engine?” he asks (2008, p.130).  Certainly, the causal structuring of thought ranges far and wide and might include atmospheric, solar, and other distant cosmic factors, which, in constituting the structuring background, transitively structures the writing (e.g. sunlight contributes to the writer’s ability to find the keyboard).  EC is often presented as a hypothesis of great empirical significance (starting with Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.648), but it appears to be in danger of compromising its legitimacy by expanding into a kind of panpsychism.​[7]​  However, Clark agrees that the rain is merely part of the structuring background and does not even partially constitute his thoughts. 
Clark then attempts to satisfy Adams and Aizawa’s demand for a mark specifying “essential features” of cognition (2008, p.130).  As he says, “coupling alone is not enough” (Clark 2008, p.131), and though “inessential features,” such as rain, can drive a cognitive process along, an external structuring condition is not cognitive if it is “not part of (it is not even a side-effect or a “spandrel” within) any system selected or maintained for the support of better cognizing” (p.130).  Here, proper functioning, itself dependent on biological recruitment, is explicitly utilized as a necessary condition for extended cognition, and so it might seem to offer a workable solution to the bloat problem.  
An important background issue for TEC, therefore, concerns what counts as a trait that is “visible” to natural selection.  An influential view is that phenotypic variation has to be explicable in terms of variation across genotypes, and, if so, then selected traits must be causally linked to one’s genes (Dawkins 2004, p.379).  It is, in short, extremely unlikely that any plausible account of the units of selection will include the wind, rain, or distant cosmic events.  The point is that structuring conditions not causally dependent on an individual’s genes pose no threat to TEC. 
However, Clark appeals to biological “recruitment” in a very broad sense including adaptations, but also spandrels and secondary selection pressures resulting in “exaptations,” and even side-effects.  As many processes can have far ranging side-effects, bloat threatens again.  So, it is not surprising Clark’s exposition restricts TEC-relevant side-effects to those occurring “within” selected cognitive mechanisms.  But this claim is not without its problems.  If being “within” the system implies being physically contained within a selected cognitive mechanism, then TEC has betrayed its own motivations.  As Rowlands (2009, p.16) emphasizes, a rejection of the demand for physical containment within the nervous system, or the biological body, is the very foundation of extended cognition; Otto’s notebook is not physically contained within Otto after all.  An alternative interpretation, supported by some of Clark’s discussion, is that being “within” the system just means causally contributing, in an ongoing way, to the process.  For example, Clark allows that an (otherwise) external stream of water droplets could be “part of the cognitive mechanism itself” in an evolved system, or an artificially designed robot if the drops “time and pace certain internal operations essential to some kinds of problem solving” (2008, p.130).  The trouble with this reading of what it means for a process (including a side effect) to be part of the cognizing system is that it is a return to mere structuring conditions, which, recall, is how the bloat problem arises.  
Clark’s version of TEC also makes use of cognitive turbo chargers.  These are feedback mechanisms that increase performance by recycling outputs as inputs, and where one is coupled with what all parties would recognize as a paradigmatic (i.e. internal) cognitive process and has the proper function of supporting cognition, he contends it is “surely part of the cognitive mechanism itself” (p.130).  In other words, Clark also seems to assert that recruited turbo-charging is sufficient for cognition.
Clark (2007, 2008) illustrates his new mark using several examples drawn from recent research.  A showcase example is gesturing, which apparently stimulates parts of the brain responsible for thought and action–including parts implicated in subsequent gesturing (2008, pp.123-5).  Cognitive turbo-chargers are not stand-alone systems but are nevertheless part of the “engine,” much like the turbo-charger in a fancy car (p.131).  When “thinking” on pen and paper (2007, p.179, 2008, p.116), or with some artificial device, such as a video display, to enhance memory (2008, p.119) the processing includes “inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world.  The local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head” (2007, p.164).  The explanatory style is localized, involving heterogeneous “cross-cutting” kinds (Khalidi 1998, Dupré 2002) subsumed under models designed to explain the exploitation of diverse resources by drawing on such law-like principles as: If the external resource is recruited, then the task specific information is accessed more rapidly (Clark 2008, p.119).  
Talk of the aims and purposes of cognitive processes are captured by Clark’s condition about what I am calling “recruitment.”  At times Clark may seem to mean recruitment consists in the decision of an agent to incorporate a resource within her activity.  Such a “psychological mode” of recruitment may seem necessary in order to account for such examples as Otto’s notebook and other technologically inspired examples (e.g. cybernetic implants) in which there is no biological selection.  On the other hand, biological recruitment takes care of couplings of which the agent might be unaware, as in the example of the (presumably) evolved gesturing system.  However, Clark (2008, p.239 n.14) distances himself from this psychological interpretation, since “talk of “recruitment”…is in no way meant to suggest the deliberate gathering of resources by a thoughtful agent.  That is, in fact, exactly the image we must avoid.”  Has he forgotten Otto’s notebook?  Actually, what he means is that conscious selection of the notebook, as in the case of artifacts generally, must be accompanied, objectively speaking, by some cost-effective change in the system enhancing a mental function by making a direct causal contribution (2008, p.122).  Then again, the rain on Clark’s windowsill objectively enhances his writing.  So it is not apparent why that process fails to be cognitive. 
In summary, Clark’s new account has two parts.  First, there must be some sort of recruitment of the asset, in the sense that it is a product of natural selection, or perhaps intelligent design in the case of artifacts, and, second, it can take the form of a cognitive turbo-charger, that is, a mechanism which, in generating positive feedback, drives a process along.  In other words, while recruitment is necessary, turbo-charging is optional (and sufficient) when it comes to extended cognizing.  However, in the next section I will argue that even recruited turbo-charging is still too permissive, since it is compatible with non-cognitive processes and so exacerbates superdupersizing.  On the other hand, the recruitment condition is too stringent, as it excludes compelling examples of cognition, or so I will argue by way of intuitive cases.  
3.  INTUITIVE CASES ABOUT RECRUITMENT AND TURBO-CHARGING
First, is cognitive turbo charging sufficient for cognition?  Earlier I suggested that depending on what counts as a side-effect occurring “within” an adapted cognitive process, TEC is in danger of either collapsing into internalism or succumbing to bloat.  The latter is expected given the ubiquity of turbo-charging structuring conditions.  Besides Clark’s example of the rain against the window, consider George Orwell’s man who drinks because he fails, but then fails all the more because he drinks, in a vicious cycle (Orwell, G., 1946/1970).  Another example is the Greenhouse Effect (suppose a warming climate leads to widespread despair and reckless consumption, and then a real intensification of global warming, and, in turn, even more nihilism).  Or take the phenomenon of “going on tilt” in poker, where bad judgment leads to poor play, which in turn leads to more bad judgment, and so on.  Any of these might form part of a structuring background of cognition generated by cognitive adaptations and spandrels.  But I take it that even Clark and Rowlands agree that empty whisky bottles, a heating atmosphere, and losing money in poker, are not literally parts of any mental operation.  
Another dramatic example draws on Simon’s comparison of internal and environmental “search-and-retrieval” processes, insofar as both consist of “mixtures of trial and error and selectivity” (Simon 1969, p.97).  While Simon deflates the mind to a small core of “genuine” mental operations (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.650 n.3), EC reverses the inference.  Now consider what follows if there is a functional parity between thinking, searching the environment, and Mother Nature’s “search” for better designs: it seems that evolution itself partly constitutes the mind—for if an evolutionary process that supports cognition (over a very long time scale) were (somehow!) to occur inside the head, and we would call it a cognitive process (and we would, given Simon), then it is a cognitive process.​[8]​ 
Certainly, this last thought experiment makes heavy demands on one’s imagination—processes transpiring over an evolutionary time frame have no chance of guiding real organisms.  Yet much latitude is granted by EC’s advocates when it comes to the formulation of EC-supporting counterfactuals about Martians, and so forth, in that physical and biological impediments are assumed magically overcome.​[9]​  So, it is consistent with precedent that if the evolutionary process supporting cognition were fantastically accelerated, shrunk, moved inside the skull, and somehow integrated within the useful processing of information, and we would call this cognition, then EC must say that process already is cognition.  As for the rejoinder that evolutionary processes are not coupled with any cognitive systems, it can be replied: they are, but the coupling is very distal.  The cognitive (and other) processes of my distant ancestors causally structure my own cognizing, and though the cognition boosting effects of their selected cognitive processes occur in me, this should be of no matter to TEC.  It sounds strange, but from the perspective of TEC very distal causes and effects of selected mechanisms can be thought of as part of the same process; so, it now seems that my ancestors are aspects of my own mind!
Maybe it makes better sense to break with Clark’s exposition and restrict TEC to the claim that only adaptations (and not spandrels and side-effects) can be cognitive vehicles.  One problem is that this would exclude notebooks and other technologies.  Another is that even turbo-charging selected-for boosting cognition is arguably still too permissive as a sufficient condition.  Consider respiration and blood circulation, which, at first, seem harmless to TEC.  While these involve output-recycling adaptations that happen to boost cognition, TEC is about traits selected for boosting cognition, not for boosting just anything, such as the amount of oxygen in the blood--the heart, for instance, is selected for pumping, not for providing representations.  Then again, there are grounds for thinking that the large size of the lungs, and other aspects of the respiratory system, might be at least partially explicable as adaptations for facilitating speech and thought.  Large lungs help sustain speech by delaying the need to take a breath.  When speaking, the muscles in the diaphragm work differently, preventing the lungs from deflating too rapidly.  It appears that “humans have developed special adaptations for breathing during speech: speech is not merely “added” to the breathing cycle; rather, the breathing cycle is adapted to the needs of speech” (Akmajian 2001, p.69).  Supposing this adaptationist gloss is correct, it would follow (given some plausible assumptions about the interdependence of thought and speech) that aspects of the lungs specifically selected for boosting cognitive processes implicated in speech are also part of the mind.
Then again, one who is willing to count arms and hands as mental vehicles might be agreeable to including the lungs and the muscles in the diaphragm as well.  In any case, EC’s advocates do not want to restrict themselves to traits that are adaptations, since this would compromise TEC’s thesis about technological enhancements.  But then function-enhancing structuring conditions, natural and artificial, are ubiquitous.  Either these are all mental vehicles, or, not.  If not, proponents of TEC owe an account as to why, and the reason cannot be that all mental vehicles are biological adaptations.  
I will argue further on that TEC’s dilemma is generated by competing commitments when it comes to timing.  The objective enhancement of a process here-and-now says something about the present; having the right sort of recruitment history says something about the past.  TEC attempts to blend diachronic and synchronic commitments that are not easily reconciled.
This brings me to the other aim of this section, which is to show that demanding cognitive vehicles have a biological recruitment history backfires.  “Going teleological” about recruitment inherits drawbacks, familiar from discussions in the philosophy of biology and mind, of attempts to naturalize functions in terms of past selection events.  A review of some of these difficulties will help explain why a historically oriented mark is inimical to the aims of active externalism.
Obviously selection cannot take place until there is already something to select, so consider the first time a mutation results in a cognition-boosting feedback loop.  Such a mutation would be exactly like a genuine cognitive process, and yet TEC (taken as offering a necessary condition) would have to regard it as ersatz (cf. Seager 1999, p.205).  If natural functions need to have a certain etiology, and all mental events are the product of natural functions, then this has the consequence that my doppelgänger produced five-seconds ago doesn’t have a mind (cf. Davidson 1987).  Though some are willing to accept this, I find it incredible that my perfect physical duplicate would fail to be conscious.​[10]​  Another startling consequence is that if it somehow turned out that evolution did not occur (suppose humans are the product of Intelligent Design) it would follow that we don’t have minds, since our bodies and brains would have no natural functions (Seager 1999, pp.166-7).  Besides their intuitive odiousness, these examples also lead me to question the value of historically individuated functional kinds in cognitive science.  While I am attracted to the view that historical kinds are useful and interesting when the aim is reconstructing the past, etiological proper functioning offers an unhelpful framework for the business of causal explanations of behavior.
Take swamp-robot, a perfect physical duplicate of its counterpart actually designed (or evolved) to spit water droplets.  Swamp-robot’s behavior and internal processes are just like the real thing, but it did not evolve, and was not designed, and so lacks a recruitment history.  So, Clark, implausibly, would have to deny that swamp-robot’s spitting-raindrop mechanism is part of its cognitive process.  Yet it falls under the same casual-explanatory kind as the original spitting-robot, in virtue of the fact that exactly the same laws and models apply when it comes to explaining how the timing-mechanism (or swamp-mechanism) boosts performance. 
To illustrate further, consider Jim, destitute, who owes money to a dangerous loan shark.  Jim’s repayment plan involves feeding a series of slugs into a slot machine at the local casino.  This scenario is analogous to the stream of water droplets used by the spitting robot, and it seems reasonable that EC implies the slugs are part of the task of placating the gangster.  The enmeshing of a stream of quarters with a slot machine arguably comprises an extended mechanism (the machine’s design takes the design of quarters into account after all).  However, the difference is that Jim’s slugs aren’t real quarters.  They aren’t part of the design of the vending machine or its processes, although we can assume they are very high quality slugs or “monetary zombies” (Seager 1999, p.197) indistinguishable from the real thing.  So, doesn’t TEC have to deny that the slugs are part of the system, just as the raindrops aren’t really part of the process of Clark’s writing?  Perhaps, and yet whether a “quarter” is counterfeit makes no difference at all when it comes to predicting and explaining its passage through the rest of the system.  True, the slugs make an objective contribution to Jim’s cognizing despite not bearing the appropriate relation to past events, and so perhaps they do count as part of the mechanism after all.  But if so, then what remains of the claim that an etiological ingredient is helpful for distinguishing genuine cognition from mere supports?  If considerations about duplicated functional roles are sufficient for counting the slugs as part of the process, then their etiology is just irrelevant. 
This section had two aims.  First, I wanted to show that there are examples of biologically recruited structuring conditions not part of any vehicle of cognition, though TEC’s problems with superdupersizing are most obvious given the case of side-effects of adapted mechanisms.  The second aim was to draw attention to examples of what EC’s advocates would have to agree are cognitive processes, but which do not satisfy the recruitment condition: Swampman has cognitive processes, but no recruitment history.  Next, I develop the objection that TEC also fails as a thesis about causal-explanatory kinds in virtue of its demand that genuine cognitive systems have a certain kind of history.
4.  TELEOLOGICAL EXTENDED COGNITION AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Perhaps TEC’s intuitive oddity can be set aside in virtue of its potential to lead cognitive science in exciting new directions.  However, critics such as Adams and Aiziwa (2001, 2009) and Rupert (2004, p.407) have objected to EC’s claim that “overarching” cognitive kinds encompassing internal and external realizers offers a more powerful, unifying, framework for cognitive science.  Adams and Aizawa (2001, p.53) contend that we don’t yet know enough about cognitive processes to say what sort of explanatory categories there are.  Meanwhile, Rupert (2004, p.390) argues that, at best, EC merely recycles explanations accessible from a more orthodox standpoint.  Internal and external forms of information storage have little in common and fail to constitute a genuinely explanatory kind (Rupert 2004, p.415).
The shift to a historically-oriented mark of the mental does nothing to alleviate these concerns.  TEC actually worsens matters given that mechanisms with identical causal-explanatory profiles could have quite different etiologies and so would have to be categorized differently.  This undercuts the claim that EC is a hypothesis of interest to cognitive science because of the laws, models, and causal explanatory power it purchases.​[11]​  The brain and other cognitive mechanisms whether defined widely or narrowly are “historically impartial” in the sense that there will be no difference in the locally realizing physical events generated by physically identical mechanisms that lack the appropriate proper function.  Historical causes of mechanisms are too distal to be of interest when it comes to explaining here-and-now behavior, much as the genuineness of a quarter does not explain why it causes a slot machine to pay out (Seager 1999, p.198).  Likewise, the historical genuineness of a proper function has no distinctive causal effects.
Another way to put this is to say that TEC is at odds with “methodological individualism,” namely the view that “no property of mental states, relational or otherwise, counts taxonomically unless it affects causal powers” (Fodor 1987, p.42).  The individuation of scientific kinds, including mental state types, usually proceeds by making distinctions between causal roles.  That causal role indiscernibility implies sameness of type (Heil and Mele, 1993)​[12]​ is a methodological constraint widely assumed in scientific explanation (as noted by Adams and Aizawa 2001, p.52).  Science is interested in causal explanations and scientific taxonomies depend on similarities and differences in causal powers (Fodor 1987, p.42).​[13]​  Of course, science has both historical and nomothetic ambitions—we can try to reconstruct the past by explaining particular events in terms of their causes, as in explaining how the arrangement of the continents today got that way, but we also try to discover the laws and causal regularities that govern the universe.  While neither ambition can be pursued to the exclusion of the other, they should not be confused—the difference is a matter of which is the present aim, and which is the means by which the aim is pursued (Sober 1998, p.15).  But although historical science depends on applying laws of nature, and, conversely, helps science discover the laws, scientific categories are almost always derived from nomothetic projects. Teleological EC is incompatible with nomothetic science, even on a very permissive conception of natural kinds, since the mechanistic explanations apply equally well to “swamp” extended mechanisms.
That the causal explanation of cognition refers only to operations connecting inputs to outputs is well known—semantic properties, and “wide” states generally, can be ignored (cf. Churchland & Churchland 1983, pp.304-5).  Similarly, proper functions dependent on distal historical causes with no impact here-and-now are irrelevant to methodologically individualistic psychology.  Another of Clark’s examples about a robot that uses part of its body to compute the implications of exclusive-or (2008, pp.208-9) also illustrates the difficulty, since a swamp-robot could produce exactly the same input-output transformations.  
Certainly biology is loaded with historical categories.  And certainly methodological individualism might be inappropriate when it comes to biological and teleological kinds.  The assumption that hearts can malfunction presupposes a strategy for grouping working and non-working hearts together, despite there being no single here-and-now mechanical model under which they both fall (Millikan, 1984).  So perhaps the relationship between nomothetic and historical projects in biology is something like this: a kind, say, hearts, are first individuated in virtue of a common history, after which scientists investigate the here-and-now properties, which might vary considerably for individual hearts.  Supposing this sort of framework is correct, why can’t something similar be said of extended mental mechanisms, assuming these are also adaptations, and where we might also expect standards for normalcy and defect?  However, it is a mistake to think that this can rescue TEC.  Hearts share a selection history, but extended mental mechanisms don’t.  There’s not even reason to think extended and internal varieties of a given mental kind (e.g. memory) would have comparable selection histories. Again: Otto’s notebook was not recruited biologically.
The historical approach to demarcation is probably incompatible with the claim that EC picks out natural kinds—kinds are usually not thought to depend on history, whether or not we reject traditional “essentialism” (Ayers, 1981).  Although the identity of individuals and lineages depend on intact relations of descent, a genuine kind, say, gold, can “go extinct” and reappear.  Or, if there are kinds at least partly defined historically (e.g. by belonging to a lineage), this entails the exclusion of synchronically identical processes and entities whose histories diverge.  TEC exhibits a tension between historical and non-historical criteria for individuating cognitive kinds.
5.  IS TELEOLOGICAL EXTERNALISM ACTIVE OR PASSIVE?
Teleological EC’s failure to respect methodological individualism also results in an embarrassing point of contact with content externalism.  Clark and Chalmers (1998, p.644) distance EC from content externalism given the latter’s rendering of mental content as inefficacious. Since locally realized states are doing all the work, wide states are irrelevant when it comes to explaining ongoing informational exchanges.  However, although “active” externalism is strongly motivated by the idea that the external factors make a difference to the dynamics of cognition, their claim that it “is not threatened by any such problem” (p.644) is mistaken.  The difficulty is lurking in the original version of EC and Clark and Chalmers’ (admittedly ambivalent) suggestion about a past conscious endorsement condition.  Notice that the other conditions of trust and glue are claims about the cognitive system’s dispositions: That Otto trusts the notebook is to say that he is disposed to be guided by its contents; to say the contents are accessed swiftly and whenever relevant also invokes dispositional factors, not passive factors having to do with the system’s history.  That content was once endorsed makes no difference for explaining cognitive dynamics.  Although past endorsement is no longer included as a condition of trust-and-glue (e.g. Clark 2005), TEC’s historical criterion for individuating genuine cognitive systems undermines the supposed difference between passive and active externalism for the same reason.  
Clark (2008) continues to champion the benefits of active externalism for cognitive science.  Content externalism is again criticized for having a “focus on distal and historical features” that do not influence “local physical vehicles” (2008, p.78).  External features are “passive and play no role in driving cognitive processes here and now,” and he contends that for “the cases described by Clark and Chalmers, by contrast, the relevant external features are active” (Clark 2008, p.79).  Certainly, their cases are driven only by considerations about dispositions; however, TEC’s inclusion of a past-selection condition courts incoherence.
Swamp-Otto (or a swamp-notebook) would satisfy the dispositional criteria and be guided to (or guide one to) the museum.  History is irrelevant to the behavior of swamp-agents and mechanisms--swamp-Otto will utilize his swamp-notebook exactly as Otto does, leading to exactly the same predictions and explanations.  Although the swamp-notebook’s contents have never been selected, this is irrelevant to the methodological individualist.  A mark of cognition directed towards the past is contrary to the spirit of (and letter) of EC, including the Parity Principle, which is supposed to broaden the inclusiveness of mental categories: swamp-turbo-mechanisms, after all, would be counted as cognitive mechanisms if they were to occur in the head; indeed, we can’t tell just by examining the head whether they contain swamp-mechanisms. 
These accumulating problems seem like a high price to pay to avoid superdupersizing.  From the point of view of understanding how a cognitive turbo-charger works we don’t need to know where it came from (though obviously knowing this is useful for knowing how it works).  What we need to know is how its properties and parts interact.  Clark’s discussion of his own examples (2007, 2008) implicitly acknowledges the distinction between nomothetic and historical explanatory aims: the research on gesturing is concerned with elucidating here-and-now, proximate mechanisms, as where “the act of gesturing somehow shifts or reduces aspects of the overall neural cognitive load, thus freeing up resources for the memory task” (2008, p.124).  A historically-oriented explanation of the origins of gesturing, and its relationship to cognizing in an evolutionary context, is a different sort of concern.  Clark mentions we can try to reverse-engineer the thought-gesture system and discover the adaptive pressures that account for its presence today, and he speculates that gesturing is “part of a unified thought-language-hand system whose coordinated activity has been selected or maintained for its specifically cognitive virtues” (2008, p.127).  But just as with Clark and Chalmers’ original conditions, Clark can’t seem to make up his mind as to whether EC is a hypothesis about proximate or distal causes.  The examples he uses support the interpretation of EC as nomothetic science, but then the deployment of historically individuated kinds is counterproductive.
Perhaps only non-distal “intrinsic” system properties should be allowed to count when it comes to picking out cognitive processes.  But it is hard to say which ones will do.  Chemero’s (2007) suggestion that the relevant parameters are dynamic properties described by non-linear equations presupposes, rather than offers a solution to, EC’s line drawing problem.  Dynamical systems models take account of the brain, body, and environment while ignoring the etiologies of system features.  But this just revisits superdupersizing: it does not distinguish extended vehicles (or their parts) from states and processes that are only aspects of the (here-and-now) structuring background.  The failure of dispositional criteria to handle bloat was, after all, the reason Clark and Chalmers were motivated to look beyond dispositional criteria.  The raindrops on the writer’s window are also dynamic fitness-enhancing factors (i.e. he meets the deadline, gets paid, and lives another day).
6. CONCLUSION
EC claims the wider environment actively contributes to, and partly constitutes, ongoing cognitive processes.  However, TEC betrays this commitment by including the distant past among the external conditions demarcating the mind-world boundary.  The difficulty is that this results in an externalism that is passive, not active, and so undercuts one of EC’s primary motivations.  Only intrinsic properties matter when it comes to how a mechanism works, and yet TEC insists that additional passive, historical properties determine whether or not they are part of the mind.  This assumption has counter-intuitive implications, but also threatens the relevance of cognitive processes when it comes to explaining behavior.
Discussion of the bloat objection helps show why EC both loses the struggle of intuitions and is not a serious scientific hypothesis.  First, there are counter examples to the claim that Teleological Extended Cognition is either necessary or sufficient.  Second, TEC implausibly assumes that membership in a psychological natural kind depends on history and seems to rest on a conflation between historical and law-seeking aims of science.  Third, insisting on a historical, passive ingredient results in incoherence.  TEC conflicts with motivations about functional parity and inherits content externalism’s alienation from historically impartial cognitive science.  
Taking etiological proper functions to be necessary comes at the cost of undermining EC’s very foundations.  Although there is precedent for using historical factors to demarcate kinds, as when attending to history leads to a gain in explanatory power, such is not the case with TEC.  Maybe there is a way to simultaneously abandon history and avoid bloat, but I leave it to the defenders of EC to make that case.​[14]​  
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^1	  I am grateful for discussions of this paper’s ancestors with Murray Clarke, Brian J. Garrett, Robert Rupert, audiences at the American Philosophical Association, McMaster University, Concordia University, and the Society for Philosophy and Psychology.  I also received thoughtful criticisms from Benjamin Baez and the anonymous referees at Philosophical Studies.
^2	  As noted by Rupert (2004), EC should be assessed as the claim that some mental vehicles are realized by extended states in the actual world, since even many critics of EC will agree that extended mental vehicles are metaphysically possible, such as Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room.
^3	  Rupert (2004) points out that EC is logically independent of semantic externalism (the view that mental contents depend on “wide” factors).  A rough summary of his reasoning is this: duplicate vehicles, narrowly individuated, might differ in their semantic content (given thought experiments about Twin-Earth) so semantic externalism does not entail vehicle externalism.  Alternatively, duplicate vehicles, individuated widely (e.g. doppelgangers with duplicate notebooks) could have identical semantic contents, despite differences in their respective environments (e.g. suppose for each party “water” means “colorless, odorless, liquid, etc…” regardless of whether it is H20 or XYZ that fills the local lakes and rivers).
^4	  Giere (2006, p.318) takes it as a reductio of EC that it implies telescopes are parts of cognitive systems. Rowlands (2009, p.15) concedes that the telescope would be part of the astronomer’s perceptual processes save for the fact that it is not integrated within consciousness.
^5	  For instance, Broad (1925, p.376).
^6	  Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2005, 2009) and Rupert (2004) have drawn attention to EC’s limitations when it comes to causal explanatory kinds.
^7	  Rupert (2004, p.424 n.58) raises the issue of panpsychism in his discussion of Donald’s (1991) theorizing about extended memory.
^8	  This is an application of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) Parity Principle:If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.644).The Parity Principle immediately invites worries about bloat, as does Clark and Chalmers’ attempted distinction between extended processes, which are genuinely “epistemic,” versus “pragmatic” actions, which merely bring about some desired change in the world (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.644, Clark 2008, p.211).
^9	  As in imagining a notebook is magically shrunk and integrated in Otto’s nervous system playing a memory-like role.
^10	  See Dretske (1995, pp.149-50) for a dissenting opinion, and more recently, Millikan (2010, pp.76-9), though she ignores the issue of consciousness.
^11	  Adams and Aizawa (2001, p.68, 2009, p.80) suggest that in addition to fitting a cognitive model, a genuine vehicle must also have non-derived content.  In any case, although they think there are brain specific psychological and psychophysical laws (2001, 2005, 2009, p.87) they doubt there are intercranial laws awaiting discovery.
^12	  Hence, Fodor could at one time hold that a belief about XYZ on Twin-Earth is still a belief about water, though this view is later abandoned (see Fodor 1995).
^13	  Methodological Individualism, despite its name, does not automatically assume that mental states are in the head, since their causal powers might depend on wide states.   It is not to be confused with Methodological Solipsism, which is incompatible with Semantic Externalism. 
^14	  Could some of the objections to TEC be answered by switching to a non-historical account of proper function, or, perhaps, non-genetic selection processes (involving neuron populations, memes, or whatever) as a way to individuate genuine content-carrying cognitive vehicles?  I have my doubts.  The first suggestion will encounter problems when it comes to some of the previously discussed counterexamples, while the second continues to advance a historical criterion that is irrelevant for the purposes of causal explanation.
